Public Sector Efficiency : Evidence for Latin America by Afonso, Antonio et al.
Public Sector Efficiency: 
Evidence for Latin 
America
António Afonso 
Alma Romero 
Emma Monsalve
Inter-American 
Development Bank
Fiscal and Municipal 
Management Division
DISCUSSION PAPER
No. IDB-DP-279
March 2013
Public Sector Efficiency: 
Evidence for Latin 
America
António Afonso 
Alma Romero 
Emma Monsalve
Inter-American Development Bank
2013
http://www.iadb.org 
  
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the 
countries they represent.  
  
The unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under 
the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws.  
  
Copyright ©       Inter-American Development Bank. All rights reserved; may be freely 
reproduced for any non-commercial purpose.
2013
. 
 
 1
 
 
Public sector efficiency: evidence for Latin 
America * 
 
 
António Afonso, $ Alma Romero,# and Emma Monsalve # 
 
 
 
 
  March 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
We compute Public Sector Performance (PSP) and Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) indicators 
and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores for a sample of twenty-three Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries (LAC) to measure efficiency of public spending for the 
period 2001-2010. Our results show that the PSE is inversely correlated with the size of the 
government, while the efficiency frontier is essentially defined by Chile, Guatemala, and 
Peru. Moreover, on average, output quantities could theoretically be proportionally increased 
by 19 percent with the same level of inputs. In addition, the performed Tobit analysis 
suggests that more transparency and regulatory quality improve the efficiency scores, while 
more transparency and control of corruption increase output-oriented efficiency.         
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1. Introduction 
The optimal size of public spending is a difficult issue to address both empirically and 
theoretically. In practice, however, policymakers must decide period by period on the level of 
public expenditure to be exerted in order to maximize social welfare (assuming governments 
are benevolent). Expenditure levels greatly vary from country to country and the effect of 
additional spending on marginal welfare gains is still open for debate. Notwithstanding, the 
literature has provided over the years evidence in support to the idea that above certain 
threshold, benefits from larger public spending, measured by improvements in key social and 
economic indicators, tend to decline. 
In early works Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, 2000) used a macro approach to identify a 
relationship between higher public spending and higher social welfare in a sample of eighteen 
industrialized economies. The authors did not find evidence of higher benefits in countries 
with higher public spending given that countries with lower levels of public spending had 
socio-economic indicators as good as their counterparts, if not better. In more recent 
contributions, Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2010) assess the outcome of public 
policies and its relationship to the resources employed to measure government performance 
and efficiency through the concepts of Public Sector Performance (PSP) and Public Sector 
Efficiency (PSE) initially applied to a sample of twenty-three industrialized OCDE countries 
and later on extended to a group of developed economies. Their overall conclusion is that 
small governments obtain better indicators than big governments and that lean public sectors 
tend to be more efficient.  
The renovated interest of academics, policy makers and international organizations on 
the analysis and quantification of the efficiency of public spending at the aggregate level has 
been recently motivated by the current challenging global conditions. The adverse position 
often faced by governments (increasing budgetary pressures and narrowing margins of action 
to significantly raise tax revenue) and the costly consequences of fiscal imbalances prompted 
by excessive accumulation of government debt to finance high spending levels, experienced 
by a handful of countries in recent past decades, has turned the attention to the ability of 
governments to achieve public policy outcomes employing the least possible amount of 
resources more relevant in recent times.1 Unfortunately, the literature on aggregate public 
sector efficiency is not abundant and international comparisons of government performance 
                                                          
1 In a numerical exercise with a calibrated model, Afonso and Gaspar (2007) find that indirect costs, associated 
with excess burden, amplify the cost of inefficiency by between 20 percent and 30 percent. 
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are largely scarce due to data unavailability, limiting the analysis of the empirics of the 
optimality of public spending. 
This paper contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of Afonso, 
Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2010), based on the computation of the Public Sector 
Performance (PSP) and Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) indicators and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), applied to a sample of twenty-three Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries (LAC) to measure efficiency of public spending for the period 2001-2010. We also 
assess the relevance of non-discretionary factors for public sector efficiency via censored 
Tobit regressions. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt in the literature to quantify 
government performance and efficiency in the Latin American region. Our results show that 
the size of the government is inversely correlated with efficiency scores, while the efficiency 
frontier is essentially defined by Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. Moreover, on average, output 
quantities could theoretically be proportionally increased by 19 percent with the same level of 
inputs. Additionally, a Tobit analysis shows that more transparency and regulatory quality 
improve the efficiency scores, while further transparency and control of corruption increase 
output-oriented efficiency.         
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literature. Section three presents the methodology. Section four reports and discusses our 
dataset, and empirical results. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Related literature	
Public sector efficiency analysis has its precedent on the literature quantifying 
productive efficiency of firms or decision making units of diverse nature. For instance, 
Cherchye and Post (2001) address efficiency of electricity generating plants, Burgess and 
Wilson (1998) of hospitals, and Wheelock and Wilson (2003) of banking institutions. Afonso 
and Santos (2008) assess efficiency of Portuguese Universities and St. Aubyn et al. (2009) of 
Universities in the European Union. Other examples are Eugène (2008) for the relative 
efficiency of Belgian general government as provider of public order and safety, in addition 
to health care and education services, while St. Aubyn (2008) offers a review of the literature 
on law and order (police, prison and judicial systems) efficiency measurement. 
In the case of public sector performance, the vast majority of the related literature has 
centered the analysis of public spending efficiency in health and education across countries. 
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) measure the efficiency of government expenditure on education 
. 
 
 5
and health in a group of African countries employing the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) 
method. Herrera and Pang (2005) quantify efficiency in both sectors using a panel of 160 
countries employing the FDH and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Afonso and 
Aubyn (2005, 2006) assess efficiency of spending in education and health in OCDE countries 
utilizing both FDH and DEA and extend their analysis by using bootstrap methods in 
subsequent works (Afonso, and St. Aubyn, 2006, 2011). Other contributions to the 
assessment of education spending efficiency are provided by Clements (2002) for the 
European Union, and St. Aubyn (2003) and Sutherland, Price, Joumard, and Nicq (2007) for 
OCDE countries. Efficiency of the health sector is addressed by Evans, Tandon, Murray and 
Lauer (2000), and Joumard, Hoeller, André, Nicq (2010). 
A smaller strand of the literature has focused on the analysis of efficiency of public 
expenditure at the subnational or aggregate level. Notable examples are Van den Eeckhaut, 
Tulkens and Jamar (1993) for the assessment of efficiency of public spending in Belgian 
municipalities, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) for Belgian local governments, Afonso and 
Fernandes (2006, 2008) for Portuguese municipalities, Afonso and Scaglioni (2007) for 
Italian regions, and Geys, Heinemann, and Kalb (2010) for German municipalities. There are, 
however, fewer contributions to the analysis of aggregate public sector spending efficiency, 
with the notable exception of Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2010).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Public sector performance   
Nonparametric methods, particularly the Data Envelopment Analysis, and the Free 
Disposal Hull in earlier works, have become the predominant approach to assess relative 
efficiency of public spending across countries and within sectors. The DEA methodology 
developed by Farrell (1957) can be used to determine efficiency by comparing actual 
spending with the minimum necessary spending to produce the same outcome (input 
approach). Such a minimum is defined by the efficiency frontier computed from sample data 
using linear programming methods assuming convexity of the production set. Alternatively, 
relative efficiency can be defined by determining the highest possible level of output to be 
produced for a given level of spending (output-oriented approach). A similar analysis can be 
conducted employing the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) methodology proposed by Deprins, 
Simar, and Tulkens (1984) which assumes free-disposability of resources in the production 
process. Limitations of both methods, sensitivity to sample variability, presence of outliers, 
and the quality of data in the case of the DEA, and the overestimation of efficient decision 
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making units in the case of the FDH (Herrera and Pang, 2005) make desirable a 
complementary approach. Due to that, we employ the concept of PSP to measure government 
performance in LAC for 2001-2010 and quantify the efficiency of such public sector 
activities computing PSE and DEA scores using total public spending-to-GDP ratios as input 
and PSP scores as output.  
Public sector performance as defined by Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (AST from 
now on) is assessed by constructing composite indicators based on observable socio-
economic variables that are assumed to be the output of pursued public policies. Specifically, 
the PSP for country i with j areas of government activity is determined by:       
 
ܲܵ ௜ܲ ൌ ෍ܲܵ ௜ܲ௝,
௡
௝ୀଵ
	݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊; 	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܲܵ ௜ܲ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܫ௞ሻ, ݇ ൌ 1,… , ݊.															ሺ1ሻ 
 
where ݂ሺܫ௞ሻ	is a function of k observable socio-economic indicators. Following AST seminar 
work we use two groups of indicators to define the PSP composite indicator as Figure 1 
shows.  
Figure 1 – Public Sector Performance Indicator (PSP) 
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The first group comprises outcomes derived from government activities as public 
administrator as well as provider of public services such as education, health and 
infrastructure. AST refer to this subset of indicators as “opportunity” indicators alluding to 
the role of the government as promoter of equal opportunities in the market place.  
The second group is composed of outcome indicators of government activities in terms 
of allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions as defined by Musgrave. Each group of 
indicators includes sub-indicators determined by the average value of the corresponding 
output variables. For instance, government performance as public administrator is defined by 
the average value of outcome indicators for corruption, burden of regulation (red tape), 
independence of the judiciary system, and the size of the informal economy. The rationale 
behind these indicators is the application of the rule of law, enforcement of contracts, defense 
of property rights and operability of well-functioning markets promoted by the state.  
The performance of the government as supplier of public goods and services is limited 
to the provision of education, health, and public infrastructure. As for education we focus on 
indicators of the quality of education (specifically on math and science) and secondary school 
enrolment rates. For health we consider the traditional output indicators of infant mortality 
and life expectancy. As for the provision of infrastructure we center our attention on the 
overall quality of public infrastructure.  
Musgravian sub-indicators are defined in a similar fashion. We use Gini coefficients as 
the output indicator for income distribution; price stability (inflation rates) and variability of 
GDP growth rates for the stability sub-indicator; and GDP per capita, unemployment, and 
GDP growth rates for economic performance. In the case of the economic variables we use 
10-year averages to focus on structural changes instead of yearly fluctuations. The rest of the 
variables employed correspond to 2010 or the closest available year.  
To obtain PSP indicators we initially assign equal weights to each sub-indicator (in 
section 4 we also present results for PSP indicators employing different weights), computed 
as the average of the corresponding outcome indicators, each one of them normalized by its 
sample mean. The PSP indicator for each country is then obtained by averaging the values of 
all sub-indicators. Resulting PSP scores are then related to the average value of one of the 
normalized output indicators. Hence, countries with PSP scores in excess of one are seen as 
good performers, as opposed to countries with PSP values below the mean.      
 
. 
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3.2. Public sector efficiency		
Performance indicators as defined by the PSP scores do not relate the achievement of 
public policies to their cost in terms of public spending. To that effect, we initially employ 
the concept of Public Sector Efficiency to weigh public sector performance in each area by 
the amount of relevant public expenditure (EXPij) that is used to achieve such performance. 
This is, for each country i with j areas of government activity the PSE is defined by:  
 
ܲܵܧ௜ ൌ ෍ܲܵ ௜ܲ௝ܧܺ ௜ܲ௝
௡
௝ୀଵ
, ݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊.																					ሺ2ሻ 
 
Hence, government performance in the area of public administration is weighted by 
spending on government consumption. The achievements in education are related to public 
spending on the education sector. The same treatment applies to health. The provision of 
public infrastructure is weighted by public spending on investment. As for the Musgravian 
tasks of the government, performance on income distribution is related to spending on 
transfers and subsidies, while outcomes on the functions of the state in terms of stability and 
economic performance are weighted by total spending. To compute PSE scores, public 
spending was normalized across countries, taking the average value of one for each of the 
aforementioned expenditure categories.  
The overall assumption behind the assessment of public sector performance and 
efficiency employing PSP and PSE indicators is that the observed outcome indicators are 
solely the result of public spending policies. It simply attributes achievements in public 
administration, education, health, public infrastructure as well as economic performance, 
stability and income distribution to public policies without acknowledging the effect of 
expenses incurred by private agents (for instance, households’ income devoted to private 
education and health services) on outcome indicators or any other external factors.      
 
3.3. DEA 
Furthermore, we also compute DEA efficiency scores, using notably our PSP composite 
indicator as an output measure. The DEA methodology, due to Farrell’s (1957) and Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex production frontier. The 
production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear programming methods. 
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The term “envelopment” stems from the fact that the production frontier envelops the set of 
observations.2 
The general relationship that we consider is given by the following function for each 
country i: 
 
 )( ii XfY  , i=1,…,n.  (3) 
 
where we have Yi – PSP, our output measure; Xi – the relevant input in country i (government 
spending as a ratio of GDP). If ( )i iY f X , then country i exhibits inefficiency. For the 
observed input levels, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and 
inefficiency can be measured by computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
 For an output-oriented specification, suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n 
Decision Management Units (DMUs). For the i-th DMU, yi is the column vector of the 
outputs and xi is the column vector of the inputs. We can define X as the (kn) input matrix 
and Y as the (mn) output matrix. For a given i-th DMU the DEA model is:3 
 
 
, 
s. to   0
         0
1' 1        
 0
i
i
Max
y Y
x X
n
 
 



  
 


  (4) 
 
 In (4),  is a scalar (that satisfies 1/1), more specifically it is the efficiency score 
that measures technical efficiency. It measures the distance between a country and the 
efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of the best practice observations. With 
1/<1, the country is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while 1 implies that the 
country is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient).  
 The vector of constants  (n1) measures the weights used to compute the location of 
an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient, and n1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones. 
The restriction 1'1 n  imposes convexity of the frontier, accounting for variable returns to 
                                                          
2 See Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001). 
3 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the duality 
property of the multiplier form of the original programming model. 
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scale. Problem (4) has to be solved for each of the n DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency 
scores.  
 We illustrate in Figure 2 a DEA production possibility frontier in the one input-one 
output case. For instance, countries A, B and C are efficient with output scores equal to 1. On 
the other hand, country D is not efficient, since its score [d2/(d1+d2)] is below unity. 
 
Figure 2 – DEA production possibility frontier, one input, one output 
 
 
 
The purpose of an input-oriented study is to evaluate by how much input quantity can 
be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities. Alternatively, and by 
computing output-oriented measures, one could also try to assess how much output quantities 
can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. The two measures 
provide the same results under constant returns to scale but give different values under 
variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, both output and input-oriented models will identify 
the same set of efficient/inefficient countries. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data and stylized facts 
The data set compiled for this study includes twenty Latin American and three 
Caribbean countries.4 We use averages for the period 2001-2010, and some descriptive 
                                                          
4 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela RB. 
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statistics are provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix, for the variables used in the 
construction of the Public Sector Performance index, in the next section.  
 
Table 1 – Public expenditure in sample countries (% of GDP), 2001-2010  
  
Total  
spending 
Government  
consumption 
Transfers and 
subsidies 
Interest  
payments 
Public  
investment 
  
Health 
  
Education
Argentina 33.68 12.97 11.39 6.37 2.94 4.91 4.63 
Belize 30.32 14.95 3.43 5.03 7.47 2.49 5.62 
Bolivia 32.58 11.85 7.58 2.40 7.53 3.48 6.21 
Brazil 34.54 20.18 6.86 3.46 1.88 3.44 4.67
Chile 21.84 7.62 10.78 0.78 2.34 3.18 3.81 
Colombia 27.60 9.81 8.23 3.68 5.87 5.31 4.17
Costa Rica 24.66 12.54 6.56 3.86 1.54 5.79 5.06 
Dominican Republic 17.03 5.97 4.82 1.47 3.02 1.97 2.01 
Ecuador 27.37 11.29 7.00 2.23 7.61 2.15 0.98 
El Salvador 19.23 9.98 4.61 2.11 2.53 3.68 3.00 
Guatemala 14.20 5.07 3.14 1.42 1.52 2.30 3.07 
Guyana 30.77 12.33 5.23 2.91 10.20 5.89 5.95 
Honduras 27.40 16.05 3.04 1.26 4.41 3.62  
Jamaica 32.84 14.71  13.62 2.57 2.46 5.26 
Mexico 23.50 11.10 4.68 2.98 2.54 2.66 5.04 
Nicaragua 27.62 11.18 8.69 1.88 4.57 4.55 3.12 
Panama 24.91 12.98 4.64 3.80 4.08 5.18 4.16 
Paraguay 18.04 9.93 3.96 0.88 2.92 2.70 4.52 
Peru 19.11 9.89 4.97 1.79 1.93 2.64 2.76 
Suriname 28.58 17.61 5.52 1.35 3.96 3.59  
Trinidad and Tobago 27.75 9.01 12.23 2.83 3.90 2.48 4.20 
Uruguay 32.34 12.01 12.43 3.88 4.02 4.81 2.55 
Venezuela 33.88 12.41 7.69 3.05 10.73 2.38 3.68 
Average 26.51 11.80 6.70 3.18 4.35 3.55 4.02 
Maximum 34.54 20.18 12.43 13.62 10.73 5.89 6.21 
Minimum 14.20 5.07 3.04 0.78 1.52 1.97 0.98 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages 
<=25%  20.28 9.45 5.35 2.12 2.49 3.34 3.71 
>=26% and <=30% 27.72 12.49 7.45 2.21 5.05 3.62 3.12 
>30% 32.62 13.92 7.80 5.09 6.40 3.73 4.82 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), WB World Development Indicators (WDI), and CEPAL.  
 
The composition and size of the sample was determined by availability of data needed 
to compute the PSP and PSE indicators. Table 1 shows the 2001-2010 average (or within this 
period according to data availability) for different expenditure categories as shares of GDP 
for the general government level when available and for the central government otherwise. 
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Total expenditure ranges from 14 to 35 percent of GDP, in line with levels typically spent by 
developing countries (Herrera and Pang, 2005). Roughly nine out of the twenty-three 
countries spend under 25 percent of GDP (Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Peru, El 
Salvador, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama), six between 26 and 30 percent 
of GDP (Ecuador, Honduras, Colombia, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname), 
and eight over 30 percent of GDP (Belize, Guyana, Uruguay, Bolivia, Jamaica, Argentina, 
Venezuela, and Brazil). We will refer to countries in the first group as small governments, 
countries in the second group as medium-size governments, and countries in the third group 
as large governments.  
Interestingly, on average, small governments have total expenditure ratios of 20 percent 
of GDP, medium governments of 28 percent of GDP, while large governments spend 33 
percent of GDP (sixty percent more than small governments and seventeen percent more than 
medium-size governments). 
Looking at spending categories we observe that government consumption is increasing 
in size with countries in the third group spending forty-seven percent more on average than 
countries with small governments. A similar pattern is revealed for transfers and subsidies 
since large governments spend on average forty-five percent more than the smallest 
governments, but only five percent more than medium governments. On the other hand, 
average interest payments are virtually identical between small and medium size 
governments, while countries with large governments spend 1.4 times more than their 
counterparts. Public investment is also increasing in the size of the government. On average, 
large governments spend twenty-six percent more on investment than medium governments 
and 1.5 times more than small governments.  
Differences in health and education spending are much less stressed by the size of 
governments, as opposed to current expenditures. We found striking similar levels of public 
spending in health between the three sizes of governments. On average large and medium 
governments spend 3.6 percent of GDP, while small governments spend 3.3 percent of GDP. 
In education, large governments spend on average 4.8 percent of GDP, followed by small 
governments with 3.7 percent of GDP and medium-sized governments with 3.1 percent of 
GDP. 
 
4.2. Computing the PSP index 
Table 2 shows the computed PSP indicators for 2010 for all sample countries. The best 
performers, according to the overall PSP index, are Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama and 
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Costa Rica. These are the countries whose governments obtain the best results in terms of 
outcome indicators without taking into consideration the costs incurred to achieve them. On 
the other hand, countries at the bottom end of the list include Paraguay, Venezuela, and 
Nicaragua.  
 
Table 2 – Public Sector Performance (PSP) indicators, 2010 
(using quality of math and science) 
 
Country 
Opportunity indicators Musgravian indicators 
Total public 
sector 
performance 
Administr
ation 
Educa
tion Health 
Infra
struc
ture 
PSP 
Opport
unity 
Distri
bution 
Stabili
ty 
Econo
mic 
perfor
mance 
PSP 
Musgra
vian 
Equal 
weigh
ts /1 
Differe
nt 
weights 
/2 
Argentina 0.98 1.15 1.02 0.91 1.01 1.09 0.49 1.08 0.89 0.96 0.92
Belize 0.91 1.03 1.02 0.91 0.97 1.13 1.68 0.83 1.21 1.07 1.15 
Bolivia 0.84 1.01 0.94 0.88 0.92 0.86 1.58 0.98 1.14 1.01 1.08 
Brazil 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.92 
Chile 1.71 1.08 1.04 1.43 1.32 0.94 1.48 1.16 1.19 1.26 1.22 
Colombia 0.98 1.17 1.00 0.93 1.02 0.86 1.28 0.87 1.01 1.02 1.01 
Costa Rica 1.37 1.47 1.04 0.93 1.20 0.96 0.77 1.17 0.97 1.10 1.02 
Dominican 
Republic 0.96 0.78 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.03 0.74 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 
Ecuador 0.85 0.99 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.06 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.98 
El Salvador 0.96 0.86 0.99 1.19 1.00 1.01 1.16 0.78 0.98 1.00 0.99 
Guatemala 0.91 0.75 0.98 1.22 0.96 0.86 1.16 1.49 1.17 1.05 1.12 
Guyana 1.05 1.23 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.08 0.79 0.56 0.81 0.95 0.88 
Honduras 0.92 0.80 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.84 0.93 1.06 0.94 0.93 0.94 
Jamaica 1.04 1.11 0.99 1.09 1.06 1.07 0.37 0.58 0.67 0.89 0.77 
Mexico 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.09 1.04 1.01 0.79 1.31 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Nicaragua 0.80 0.71 1.00 0.80 0.83 1.16 0.85 0.65 0.89 0.85 0.87 
Panama 0.85 0.91 1.02 1.19 0.99 0.94 1.59 1.23 1.25 1.10 1.19 
Paraguay 0.82 0.81 0.99 0.65 0.82 0.93 0.65 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Peru 0.82 0.98 1.00 0.91 0.93 1.01 1.83 1.07 1.30 1.09 1.21 
Suriname 1.05 0.98 0.97 1.09 1.02  1.30 0.92 1.11 1.05 1.05 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1.15 1.28 0.97 1.14 1.13 1.17 0.76 1.70 1.21 1.17 1.19 
Uruguay 1.34 1.07 1.02 1.12 1.14 1.07 0.55 0.95 0.86 1.02 0.93 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.73 1.02 1.01 0.75 0.88 1.08 0.26 0.95 0.76 0.83 0.79 
Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 1.71 1.47 1.04 1.43 1.32 1.17 1.83 1.70 1.30 1.26 1.22 
Minimum 0.73 0.71 0.94 0.65 0.82 0.84 0.26 0.56 0.67 0.82 0.77 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages                   
<= 25% 1.05 0.96 1.01 1.06 1.02 0.97 1.13 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.06 
>= 26% and <= 
30% 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.01 
> 30% 0.98 1.06 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.03 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.96 0.93 
1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/7 to total indicator. 
2/ Opportunity indicators contribute 1/16 each (1/4 in total); Musgravian indicators contribute 1/4 each. 
 
Public sector performance for each sub-indicator is also listed in Table 2. Regarding 
public administration the governments of Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay obtain the best 
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scores. In education, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana take the first places. In 
health, Costa Rica and Chile top the list, while in the provision of public infrastructure Chile, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama perform the best. For the administrative functions as a 
whole Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay obtain the highest scores. As for the Musgravian 
functions of the government, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, and Belize obtain the best 
results on income distribution; Peru, Belize, and Panama on stability; and Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guatemala, and Mexico on economic performance. For the overall PSP Musgravian 
indicator Peru, Panama, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago rank the best. 
Moreover, we can also see that PSP is inversely correlated with the size of the 
government, and the same applies to the sub-indicator so-called Musgravian PSP. Recall that 
we are labeling countries in terms of the size of the government, as small, medium-size, or 
large governments, depending respectively on the ratio of government spending-to-GDP 
being under 25 percent, between 26 and 30 percent, or over 30 percent.  
In addition, we also computed the PSP indicators replacing the variable “Quality of 
Math and Science” by the variable “Literacy Rate”, since such indicator is more relevant for 
this sample country, than, for instance, for OECD countries. Still, such results, as reported in 
Table 3 show a rather similar picture. 
We also computed PSP scores for each model assigning different weights to different 
sub-indicators. In particular, we assigned the least possible equal weight to administrative 
sub-indicators whose output indicators are mostly derived from surveys (Eugène, 2008) and 
placing a higher weight on economic variables. Therefore, we assigned ¾ of the weight to 
Musgravian sub-indicators and ¼ to opportunity sub-indicators (1/16 each). Results are very 
similar to the ones obtained applying equal weights. Most countries that obtained PSP scores 
above the average score of one the first time are also seen as good performers in the second 
exercise with the exception of Uruguay and El Salvador whose scores were close to the cut-
off value of one. Otherwise, the list of countries with PSP scores below one stayed the same 
as can be observed in tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 3 – Public Sector Performance (PSP) indicators, 2010 
(using the literacy rate) 
Country 
Opportunity indicators Musgravian indicators 
Total public 
sector 
performance 
Administ
ration 
Educa
tion 
Healt
h 
Infras
tructu
re 
PSP 
Opport
unity 
Distrib
ution 
Stabi
lity 
Econo
mic 
perfor
mance 
PSP 
Musgr
avian 
Equ
al 
weig
hts 
/1 
Diffe
rent 
weig
hts /2 
Argentina 0.98 1.15 1.02 0.91 1.01 1.09 0.49 1.08 0.89 0.96 0.92 
Belize 0.91 1.00 1.02 0.91 0.96 1.13 1.68 0.83 1.21 1.07 1.15 
Bolivia 0.84 1.01 0.94 0.88 0.92 0.86 1.58 0.98 1.14 1.01 1.08 
Brazil 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.93 
Chile 1.71 1.16 1.04 1.43 1.34 0.94 1.48 1.16 1.19 1.27 1.23 
Colombia 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.86 1.28 0.87 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Costa Rica 1.37 1.05 1.04 0.93 1.10 0.96 0.77 1.17 0.97 1.04 1.00
Dominican 
Republic 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.03 0.74 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.91 
Ecuador 0.85 0.90 1.01 0.96 0.93 0.99 1.06 0.93 0.99 0.96 0.98 
El Salvador 0.96 0.89 0.99 1.19 1.01 1.01 1.16 0.78 0.98 1.00 0.99 
Guatemala 0.91 0.72 0.98 1.22 0.96 0.86 1.16 1.49 1.17 1.05 1.12 
Guyana 1.05 1.14 0.97 0.99 1.04 1.08 0.79 0.56 0.81 0.94 0.87 
Honduras 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.84 0.93 1.06 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Jamaica 1.04 1.10 0.99 1.09 1.05 1.07 0.37 0.58 0.67 0.89 0.77 
Mexico 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.09 1.05 1.01 0.79 1.31 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Nicaragua 0.80 0.77 1.00 0.80 0.84 1.16 0.85 0.65 0.89 0.86 0.88 
Panama 0.85 1.03 1.02 1.19 1.02 0.94 1.59 1.23 1.25 1.12 1.20 
Paraguay 0.82 0.97 0.99 0.65 0.86 0.93 0.65 0.88 0.82 0.84 0.83 
Peru 0.82 1.07 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.01 1.83 1.07 1.30 1.10 1.21 
Suriname 1.05 0.89 0.97 1.09 1.00 1.30 0.92 1.11 1.04 1.04
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1.15 1.05 0.97 1.14 1.08 1.17 0.76 1.70 1.21 1.13 1.18 
Uruguay 1.34 1.06 1.02 1.12 1.13 1.07 0.55 0.95 0.86 1.01 0.93 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.73 1.06 1.01 0.75 0.89 1.08 0.26 0.95 0.76 0.83 0.79 
Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 1.71 1.16 1.04 1.43 1.34 1.17 1.83 1.70 1.30 1.27 1.23 
Minimum 0.73 0.72 0.94 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.26 0.56 0.67 0.83 0.77 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages 
<= 25% 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.06 1.03 0.97 1.13 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.06 
>= 26% and 
<= 30% 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.03 0.99 1.00 
> 30% 0.98 1.06 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.03 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.96 0.93
1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/7 to total indicator. 
2/ Opportunity indicators contribute 1/16 each (1/4 in total); Musgravian indicators contribute 1/4 each. 
 
Finally, in an effort to measure public sector performance across time we complement 
our analysis by computing PSP indicators for 2000. A word of caution is in order when 
making the comparative analysis. Changes in public sector performance experienced by 
countries over time are measured relative to that of other countries. Hence, a given country 
could have improved its PSP score over time either because of the improvement of its output 
indicators or because other countries in the sample obtained weaker results. Another 
limitation of the analysis is that when comparing PSP scores over time there is no 
. 
 
 16
differentiation of initial conditions among countries. Hence, more advanced countries (in 
terms of achievement of output indicators) may obtain marginal improvements in some of the 
output indicators simply because there is little room for them to do so, while less advanced 
countries may experience the opposite situation. 
Although the comparison of PSP indicators do not offer a dynamic framework, the 
contrast of two different time periods could still be useful to identify significant changes in 
performance among groups of countries. Figure 3 shows PSP indicators in 2000 and 2010.     
 
Figure 3 – PSP indicators in 2000 and 2010 (equal weights using quality of math and science) 
 
 
  
It is worth noting that on average, countries with small governments obtain better PSP 
scores both in 2000 and 2010 than medium and large governments (notwithstanding the slight 
decline in public sector performance). Medium-sized governments, on the other hand, seem 
to have improved their PSP scores from 2000 to 2010, although in 2000 they reported the 
lowest average scores of the three groups. There was little change in performance in the 
large-government group with marginally lower scores in 2010 (0.96) when compared with 
average scores in 2000 (0.97). 
 
4.3. Computing PSE  
To assess the efficiency of the public sector we now relate its performance to the cost 
incurred by governments to achieve it. PSE scores are computed for each country by 
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weighting each sub-indicator by the relevant spending category as described in section 3. 
Table 4 shows the PSE measures for all countries. 
 
Table 4 – Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) indicators, 2010 
(using quality of math and science) 
Country 
Opportunity indicators Musgravian indicators 
Total public 
sector 
performance 
Administ
ration 
Educa
tion 
Heal
th 
Infrastr
ucture 
PSE 
Opport
unity 
Distrib
ution 
Stabi
lity 
Econo
mic 
perfor
mance 
PSE 
Musgr
avian 
Equ
al 
weig
hts 
/1 
Diffe
rent 
weig
hts 
/2 
Argentina 0.89 1.00 0.74 1.35 0.99 0.64 0.39 0.85 0.63 0.84 0.72 
Belize 0.71 0.74 1.45 0.53 0.86 2.22 1.47 0.72 1.47 1.12 1.32 
Bolivia 0.83 0.65 0.96 0.51 0.74 0.76 1.29 0.80 0.95 0.83 0.89 
Brazil 0.55 0.78 1.03 2.18 1.13 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.98 0.86 
Chile 2.65 1.14 1.16 2.67 1.91 0.58 1.79 1.41 1.26 1.63 1.42 
Colombia 1.18 1.13 0.67 0.70 0.92 0.70 1.23 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Costa Rica 1.29 1.17 0.64 2.65 1.44 0.98 0.82 1.25 1.02 1.26 1.12 
Dominican 
Republic 1.90 1.56 1.79 1.32 1.64 1.44 1.15 1.42 1.34 1.51 1.41 
Ecuador 0.89 4.06 1.68 0.55 1.80 0.95 1.03 0.90 0.96 1.44 1.17 
El Salvador 1.14 1.16 0.95 2.06 1.33 1.47 1.60 1.08 1.38 1.35 1.37
Guatemala 2.12 0.98 1.51 3.51 2.03 1.84 2.16 2.79 2.26 2.13 2.21 
Guyana 1.00 0.83 0.58 0.42 0.71 1.39 0.68 0.49 0.85 0.77 0.82 
Honduras 0.68   0.98 0.95 0.87 1.86 0.90 1.03 1.26 1.06 1.06 
Jamaica 0.83 0.85 1.44 1.86 1.24   0.30 0.47 0.39 0.96 0.96 
Mexico 1.09 0.80 1.37 1.55 1.20 1.44 0.89 1.47 1.27 1.23 1.25 
Nicaragua 0.84 0.91 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.90 0.82 0.63 0.78 0.81 0.79 
Panama 0.77 0.88 0.70 1.28 0.91 1.36 1.69 1.31 1.45 1.14 1.32 
Paraguay 0.98 0.73 1.30 0.97 0.99 1.58 0.95 1.30 1.27 1.11 1.20 
Peru 0.97 1.43 1.35 2.06 1.45 1.37 2.53 1.48 1.79 1.60 1.71 
Suriname 0.70   0.96 1.20 0.96   1.21 0.85 1.03 0.99 0.99 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1.50 1.22 1.39 1.28 1.35 0.64 0.73 1.62 1.00 1.20 1.09 
Uruguay 1.31 1.69 0.75 1.21 1.24 0.58 0.45 0.78 0.60 0.97 0.76 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.69 1.11 1.50 0.31 0.90 0.94 0.21 0.74 0.63 0.79 0.70 
Average 1.11 1.18 1.12 1.39 1.19 1.17 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.16 1.13 
Maximum 2.65 4.06 1.79 3.51 2.03 2.22 2.53 2.79 2.26 2.13 2.21 
Minimum 0.55 0.65 0.58 0.31 0.71 0.58 0.21 0.47 0.39 0.77 0.70 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages                   
<= 25% 1.44 1.09 1.20 2.01 1.43 1.34 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.44 1.45 
>= 26% and 
<= 30% 0.97 1.83 1.08 0.91 1.12 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.07 1.00 
> 30% 0.85 0.96 1.06 1.05 0.98 1.06 0.69 0.70 0.78 0.91 0.88 
1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/7 to total indicator. 
2/ Opportunity indicators contribute 1/16 each (1/4 in total); Musgravian indicators contribute 1/4 each. 
 
The overall PSE score places Guatemala, Chile, and Peru in the top of the group, 
followed by the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Comparing rankings from 
the PSP and PSE scores we observe that some of the countries that top the performance list, 
like Trinidad and Tobago and Panama, are not among the most efficient by PSE scores. This 
. 
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implies that in such countries government performance is obtained at a high cost. On the 
other hand, countries like Guatemala and the Dominican Republic rank among the efficient 
countries in spite of not being consider as top performers under the PSP composite indicator. 
It is noteworthy that all countries with small governments (total public spending below 25 
percent of GDP) are efficient according to PSE scores. The result is robust to the change in 
the “quality of education” variable for “literacy rate” and the use of different weights on PSP 
sub-indicators. 
Looking at PSE scores by sub-indicators we find that the most efficient countries 
carrying out administrative duties are Chile, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. 
Ecuador, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic obtain the best scores in education and the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala in health. In the provision of public 
infrastructure Guatemala, Chile, and Costa Rica top the list. For the overall administrative 
functions Guatemala, Chile, and Ecuador obtain the best scores while for the overall PSE 
Musgravian sub-indicators Guatemala, Peru, and Belize are the best ranked. Regarding 
income distribution, Belize, Honduras, and Guatemala are the most efficient. In terms of 
economic stability Peru, Guatemala and Chile obtain the highest PSE scores, and Guatemala, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru score the best in economic performance.  
Figure 4 further illustrates this efficiency and performance assessment by placing the 
countries into four quadrants taking into account those two dimensions. Therefore, we see 
that some countries have a good performance (the two right-hand side quadrants), such as 
Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, but these can then be split into more efficient (upper 
quadrant) and less efficient (lower quadrant). On the other hand, the two left-hand side 
quadrants depict cases of lower performance, and particularly the lower left-hand side 
quadrant, where we can see a sub-sample of less effective and less efficient countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Figure 4 - PSP and PSE in 2010  
 
 
 
4.4. DEA results 
In order to better clarify the efficiency analysis we also assess public sector efficiency 
applying the DEA approach using the PSP scores as an output and total spending-to-GDP 
ratios as input.  
The DEA results are reported in Table 5, and we find that efficiency scores rank 
countries in a similar fashion, but now we have more information, notably regarding the peers 
of each country that is not in the production possibility frontier, which is also graphically 
illustrated in Figure 5. On average, input efficiency score is 60 percent while output 
efficiency score is 81 percent. This means that countries can achieve the same level of 
outcome using 40 percent less spending or can increase their performance by 19 percent with 
the same level of inputs.   
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Table 5 – DEA results, 2010 
(1 input, government spending; 1 output, PSP using quality of math and science) 
 
  Input oriented Output oriented Peers     
  VRSTE Rank VRSTE Rank Input / output CRSTE Rank 
Argentina 0.422 21 0.759 16 GUA, / CHI 0.384 20 
Belize 0.492 16 0.849 7 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.477 14 
Bolivia 0.436 19 0.801 13 GUA, / CHI 0.419 17 
Brazil 0.411 23 0.739 18 GUA, / CHI 0.364 22 
Chile 1.000 1 1.000 1 CHI / CHI 0.780 2 
Colombia 0.514 13 0.804 12 GUA, / CHI 0.496 12 
Costa Rica 0.648 8 0.872 6 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.602 7 
Dominican Republic 0.833 3 0.801 14 GUA, / CHI, GUA 0.717 4 
Ecuador 0.519 11 0.769 15 GUA, / CHI 0.479 13 
El Salvador 0.738 6 0.836 8 GUA, / CHI, GUA 0.698 5 
Guatemala 1.000 1 1.000 1 GUA / GUA 1.000 1 
Guyana 0.461 17 0.755 17 GUA, / CHI 0.418 18 
Honduras 0.518 12 0.736 19 GUA, / CHI 0.458 15 
Jamaica 0.432 20 0.707 21 GUA, / CHI 0.367 21 
Mexico 0.604 10 0.820 10 GUA, / CHI 0.595 9 
Nicaragua 0.514 14 0.676 22 GUA, / CHI 0.417 19 
Panama 0.646 9 0.875 5 GUA, CHI / CHI, GUA 0.598 8 
Paraguay 0.787 5 0.708 20 GUA, / CHI, GUA 0.613 6 
Peru 0.811 4 0.916 4 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.768 3 
Suriname 0.497 15 0.834 9 GUA, / CHI 0.497 11 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.661 7 0.924 3 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.567 10 
Uruguay 0.439 18 0.805 11 GUA, / CHI 0.424 16 
Venezuela, RB 0.419 22 0.656 23 GUA, / CHI 0.330 23 
Average 0.60   0.81     0.54   
Maximum 1.00  1.00   1.00  
Minimum 0.41  0.66   0.33  
Standard deviation 0.18   0.09     0.17   
Total spending, % of GDP, averages           
<= 25% 0.79  0.87   0.71  
>= 26% and <= 30% 0.54  0.79   0.49  
> 30% 0.44   0.76     0.40   
 
Notes: 1) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 2) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency 
frontier. 3) CRSTE is constant returns to scale technical efficiency. CHI-Chile; GUA-Guatemala. 
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Figure 5 – Production possibility frontier 2010  
(DEA, 1 input, government spending; 1 output, PSP) 
 
 
 
For comparison purposes we report in Table 6 the DEA results, still with one input and 
one output, for the case where the PSP is computed using the literacy rate instead of the 
quality of math and science. Results are very similar. 
In addition, we redid the analysis using instead of the overall PSP indicator, two inputs, 
which are the so-called opportunity PSP and Musgravian PSP sub-indicators. The results in 
Table 7 show that in this case, and besides Chile and Guatemala, also now Peru shows up in 
the efficiency frontier. In fact, Peru was rather close the frontier in the one input and one 
output set of results. Finally, Table 8 summarizes the set of DEA results. 
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Table 6 – DEA results, 2010 
(1 input, government spending; 1 output, PSP (using literacy rate)) 
 
  Input oriented Output oriented Peers     
  VRSTE Rank VRSTE Rank Input / output CRSTE Rank 
Argentina 0.422 21 0.753 16 GUA, / CHI 0.385 20 
Belize 0.489 16 0.838 6 CHI, GUA / CHI 0.477 13 
Bolivia 0.436 19 0.794 13 GUA / CHI 0.420 18 
Brazil 0.411 23 0.742 18 GUA / CHI 0.371 21 
Chile 1.000 1 1.000 1 CHI / CHI 0.789 2 
Colombia 0.514 13 0.785 14 GUA / CHI 0.490 12 
Costa Rica 0.576 10 0.818 9 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.572 9 
Dominican Republic 0.833 4 0.821 8 GUA, / CHI, GUA 0.738 4 
Ecuador 0.519 11 0.753 15 GUA / CHI 0.474 14 
El Salvador 0.738 6 0.835 7 GUA / CHI, GUA 0.703 5 
Guatemala 1.000 1 1.000 1 GUA / GUA 1.000 1 
Guyana 0.461 17 0.739 19 GUA / CHI 0.414 19 
Honduras 0.518 12 0.743 17 GUA / CHI 0.468 15 
Jamaica 0.432 20 0.700 21 GUA / CHI 0.367 22 
Mexico 0.604 9 0.818 10 GUA / CHI 0.600 8 
Nicaragua 0.514 14 0.678 22 GUA, / CHI 0.423 17 
Panama 0.668 7 0.880 5 CHI, GUA / CHI 0.609 7 
Paraguay 0.787 5 0.724 20 GUA / CHI, GUA 0.631 6 
Peru 0.836 3 0.923 3 CHI, GUA / CHI, GUA 0.780 3 
Suriname 0.497 15 0.816 11 GUA / CHI 0.492 11 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.617 8 0.891 4 CHI, GUA / CHI 0.553 10 
Uruguay 0.439 18 0.797 12 GUA / CHI 0.425 16 
Venezuela, RB 0.419 22 0.655 23 GUA / CHI 0.333 23 
Average 0.60   0.80    0.54   
Maximum 1.00  1.00   1.00  
Minimum 0.41  0.65   0.33  
Standard deviation 0.18   0.09     0.17   
Total spending, % of GDP, averages           
<= 25% 0.78  0.87   0.71  
>= 26% and <= 30% 0.53  0.78   0.48  
> 30% 0.44   0.75     0.40   
 
Notes: 1) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 2) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency 
frontier. 3) CRSTE is constant returns to scale technical efficiency. CHI-Chile; GUA-Guatemala. 
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Table 7 – DEA results, 2010 
(1 input, government spending; 2 outputs, PSP-Opportunity, PSP-Musgravian) 
 
  Input oriented Output oriented Peers     
  VRSTE Rank VRSTE Rank Input / output CRSTE Rank 
Argentina 0.453 20 0.769 19 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.443 19 
Belize 0.529 14 0.950 6 GUA, CHI, PER / PER, CHI 0.485 17 
Bolivia 0.436 21 0.893 9 GUA / PER, PER 0.424 21 
Brazil 0.411 23 0.757 20 GUA / CHI, PER 0.403 22 
Chile 1.000 1 1.000 1 CHI / CHI 0.888 2 
Colombia 0.560 11 0.828 14 GUA, CHI / CHI, PER 0.546 11 
Costa Rica 0.786 6 0.914 7 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.719 6 
Dominican Republic 0.833 4 0.833 13 GUA / GUA, CHI 0.789 4 
Ecuador 0.519 16 0.808 15 GUA / CHI. PER 0.514 14 
El Salvador 0.783 7 0.839 12 GUA, CHI/ GUA, CHI 0.769 5 
Guatemala 1.000 1 1.000 1 GUA / GUA 1.000 1 
Guyana 0.529 15 0.805 16 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.507 15 
Honduras 0.518 17 0.769 18 GUA, / CHI, PER 0.495 16 
Jamaica 0.494 19 0.803 17 GUA, CHI / CHI 0.474 18 
Mexico 0.671 10 0.850 11 GUA, CHI/ CHI. PER 0.650 8 
Nicaragua 0.514 18 0.719 21 GUA, / CHI, PER 0.441 20 
Panama 0.733 8 0.980 4 GUA, CHI, PER / PER, CHI 0.610 9 
Paraguay 0.787 5 0.718 22 GUA / PER, CHI 0.669 7 
Peru 1.000 1 1.000 1 PER / PER 0.826 3 
Suriname 0.542 13 0.896 8 GUA, CHI / CHI, PER 0.527 12 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.690 9 0.979 5 GUA, CHI, PER / CHI, PER 0.602 10 
Uruguay 0.555 12 0.863 10 GUA, CHI/ CHI 0.518 13 
Venezuela, RB 0.419 22 0.665 23 GUA / CHI 0.381 23 
Average 0.64   0.85     0.59   
Maximum 1.00  1.00   1.00  
Minimum 0.41  0.67   0.38  
Standard deviation 0.19   0.10     0.17   
Total spending, % of GDP, averages           
<= 25% 0.84  0.90   0.77  
>= 26% and <= 30% 0.56  0.83   0.52  
> 30% 0.48   0.81     0.45   
 
Notes: 1) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 2) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency 
frontier. 3) CRSTE is constant returns to scale technical efficiency. CHI-Chile; GUA-Guatemala. 
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 Table 8 – Descriptive statistics of DEA efficiency scores and model specification 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 sc
or
es
 
Average Input 0.600 0.597 0.642 
 Output 0.810 0.804 0.854 
Maximum   1.000 1.000 1.000 
Minimum Input 0.411 0.411 0.411
 Output 0.656 0.655 0.665 
Std. dev. Input 0.182 0.184 0.190 
  Output 0.092 0.090 0.099 
Total countries   23 23 23 
Total efficient countries 2 2 3 
Countries on the frontier Chile, 
Guatemala 
Chile, 
Guatemala 
Chile, 
Guatema, 
Peru 
Inputs public spending 
public 
spending 
public 
spending 
Outputs 
PSP (using 
quality of 
math) 
PSP (using 
literacy rate) 
PSP 
Opportunity 
  
PSP 
Musgravian 
Correlation of 
rankings with 
model 1 
Input   0.994 0.932 
Output   0.968 0.957 
Note: summary of VRS TE results. 
 
4.5. Non-discretionary factors 
The DEA approach considers essentially discretionary inputs, the ones for which 
quantities can be changed rather autonomously by the policy makers in each country (e. g. 
government spending). However, exogenous constraints or so-called non-discretionary inputs 
play a role in the possibility of attaining outputs more efficiently. Among such non-
discretionary factors that also influence outcomes we may have socio-economic differences, 
geographical constraints, household wealth, parental education, and more institutional related 
characteristics such as the level and quality of property rights, the degree of transparency, the 
rule of law or the ability to control corruption. The literature proposes several ways of 
tackling this question, usually via an additional assessment, trying to explain efficiency 
scores.5 This is our approach here as well, briefly sketched below. 
Let zi be a (1 r) vector of non-discretionary outputs. In a typical two-stage approach, 
the following regression is estimated:  
 
 iii z  ˆ ,  (5) 
 
                                                          
5 See Ruggiero (2004) and Simar and Wilson (2007) for an overview. 
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where iˆ  is the efficiency score from solving (4), step one.  is a (r1) vector of parameters 
to be estimated in step two associated with each considered non-discretionary input. Since we 
know that 1ˆ i  one can estimate (5) using censored regression techniques (Tobit).  
For the purpose of illustration, we can see in Figure 6 that countries A, B and C are 
efficient, while country D is inefficient. The output score for country D is d1/(d1+d2) and is 
lower than one. Nevertheless, country D’s inefficiency may be partly due to a number of non-
discretionary factors forcing country D to produces less than the theoretical maximum, even 
if discretionary inputs are efficiently used. If the exogenous environment for country D were 
more favourable, then we could have observed Dc. In other words, country D would have 
produced more and would be nearer the production possibility. The environment corrected 
output score would be d1c/(d1c+d2c), higher than d1/(d1+d2), and closer to unity.  
 
Figure 6 – DEA and non-discretionary outputs 
 
 
 
 Therefore, we also use a Tobit estimation, to explain the efficiency scores obtained 
before in the three DEA specifications (tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively Model 1, 2 and 3), and 
we present in Table 9 those two step results (non-discretionary input data and source are in 
the Appendix), using average data for the period 2000-2010 for the non-discretionary factors. 
It is possible to observe that more transparency and regulatory quality improve the efficiency 
scores, both from an output and from an input-oriented perspective. On the other hand, 
property rights and the control of corruption improve the output efficiency scores. In 
addition, the fit of the estimations is overall always better in explaining the output efficiency 
scores. 
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 Therefore, better quality indicators, regarding how easy and transparent is for 
businesses in a given country to obtain information about changes in government policies and 
regulation affecting their activities, as well as the perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
activities, seem to constrain the efficiency of the government itself.6 
 
Table 9 – Censored normal Tobit results (23 countries) 
 
 
Dependent 
eff. score 
Model 1 
 
Input 
 
 
Output 
Model 2 
 
Input 
 
 
Output 
Model 3 
 
Input 
 
 
Output 
Constant 0.6191 
(0.000) 
0.8227 
(0.000) 
0.6155 
(0.000) 
0.8160 
(0.000) 
0.6693 
(0.000) 
0.8708 
(0.000) 
REG 0.1590 
(0.002) 
0.1126 
(0.000) 
0.1517 
(0.002) 
0.1068 
(0.000) 
0.2024 
(0.004) 
0.1253 
(0.000) 
ˆ  0.1723 0.0765 0.1756 0.0752 0.1707 0.0823 
Constant 0.1682 
(0.5472) 
0.4635 
(0.000) 
0.1958 
(0.490) 
0.4865 
(0.000) 
0.0852 
(0.774) 
0.4847 
(0.001) 
TRSP 0.1196 
(0.114) 
0.0956 
(0.006) 
0.1113 
(0.147) 
0.0876 
(0.012) 
0.1550 
(0.054) 
0.1025 
(0.011) 
ˆ  0.1823 0.0842 0.1849 0.0840 0.1847 0.0909 
Constant 0.2796 
(0.1708) 
0.5496 
(0.000) 
0.2949 
(0.154) 
0.5597 
(0.000) 
0.2287 
(0.288) 
0.5688 
(0.000) 
PROP 0.0829 
(0.104) 
0.0670 
(0.004) 
0.0782 
(0.130) 
0.0628 
(0.006) 
0.1076 
(0.046) 
0.0739 
(0.004) 
ˆ  0.1814 0.0826 0.1839 0.0820 0.1827 0.0879 
Constant 0.6273 
(0.000) 
0.8418 
(0.000) 
0.6217 
(0.000) 
0.8326 
(0.000) 
0.6855 
(0.000) 
0.8909 
(0.000) 
CCORR 0.0704 
(0.313) 
0.0950 
(0.002) 
0.0619 
(0.379) 
0.0846 
(0.007) 
0.1085 
(0.149) 
0.1023 
(0.005) 
ˆ  0.1886 0.0814 0.1906 0.0827 0.1923 0.0879 
 
Notes: REG – regulatory quality; TRSP – transparency; PROP – property rights; CCORR – control of corruption. ˆ  – 
Estimated standard deviation of  p-values in brackets. Model 1 – 1 input, government spending; 1 output, PSP using quality 
of math and science. Model 2 – 1 input, government spending; 1 output, PSP (using literacy rate). Model 3 – 1 input, 
government spending; 2 outputs, PSP-Opportunity, PSP-Musgravian. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We assess government performance, defined as the outcome of public sector 
activities, for a sample of twenty-three Latin American and Caribbean Countries for the 
period 2001-2010, by computing Public Sector Performance (PSP) scores. We also quantify 
the efficiency of public sectors in achieving such performance by relating PSP scores to 
public spending by means of Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) and DEA scores. We find that 
majority of countries with total expenditure-to-GDP ratios below 25 percent (77 percent) 
                                                          
6 We assessed also other non-discretionary institutional factors such as voice and accountability, public trust in 
politicians, or the rule of law, but they were not as relevant or even statistically significant in explaining the 
efficiency scores. 
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perform the best, followed by countries with total spending between 26 and 30 percent (50 
percent) and large governments with total spending-to-GDP ratios over 30 percent (38 
percent). Moreover, 100 percent of small governments are ranked as more efficient according 
to PSE scores, against 50 and 13 percent of medium and large governments.  
We find similar results applying the DEA methodology where Guatemala and Chile 
are placed on the efficiency frontier in the one input (total spending)-one output version (PSP 
scores), joined by Peru in the one input (total spending)-two outputs (PSP-administrative and 
PSP-Musgravian) model. In both cases, nine out of the top ten most efficient countries (input-
oriented approach) are countries with small public sectors. According to the DEA, the sample 
countries could use on average 40 percent less of the employed resources to attain the same 
output level, or alternatively increase their output production by 19 percent with the same 
level of total spending if they were technically efficient. 
 Employing a Tobit analysis to explain efficiency scores in a second step, we find that 
notably more transparency and regulatory quality improve the efficiency scores, both from an 
output and from an input-oriented perspective. On the other hand, more transparency and 
control of corruption, and better regulatory quality and property rights increase output-
oriented efficiency.         
In summary, our analysis shows that public sector efficiency is inversely correlated 
with the size of the government. This result is in line with previous findings for industrialized 
countries and emerging markets (Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2010)).  
A final word of caution on the interpretation of results, particularly at the country 
level, is in order. Public sector performance and efficiency are measured in relative terms 
only. Hence, country comparisons must be handling carefully and not being taken out of 
context. According to the employed methodology, improvements in country performance are 
linked to the achievement of higher output indicators or the worsening of results obtained by 
its peers. By the same token, efficiency scores are affected by the cost incurred by a country 
in obtaining such output indicators (public spending), relative to the input-output ratio used 
by its peers. Finally, even if a country is placed on the efficient DEA frontier, this does not 
imply that there is no room for improvement either in the achievement of better outcome 
indicators (directly linked to performance) or the current input/output ratio.      
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Opportunity indicators, 2010 
Country 
Corrup
tion  
Red 
tape 
Judicial 
indepe
ndence 
Shado
w 
econo
my 
School 
enrolm
ent 
second
ary net 
Qual
ity 
of 
math 
and 
scien
ce 
Liter
acy 
rate 
Infant 
morta
lity 
Life 
expecta
ncy 
Infrastru
cture 
quality 
Argentina 2.90 2.50 2.60 27.80 82.19 3.20 97.73 12.30 75.63 3.50 
Belize 2.90 2.90 3.10 45.60 64.99 3.30 94.10 14.20 75.84 3.50 
Bolivia 2.80 3.20 3.00 70.70 68.10 3.00 90.70 41.70 66.27 3.40 
Brazil 3.70 2.00 3.70 43.00  2.70 90.04 17.30 73.10 3.60 
Chile 7.20 3.60 5.50 21.10 82.56 2.80 98.65 7.70 78.89 5.50 
Colombia 3.50 2.90 3.50 45.10 74.39 3.70 93.24 18.10 73.43 3.60 
Costa Rica 5.30 3.10 4.90 28.30  4.40 96.06 8.70 79.19 3.60 
Dominican 
Republic 3.00 2.90 2.70 33.60 62.33 1.90 88.24 22.30 73.20 3.50 
Ecuador 2.50 2.90 2.30 38.80 58.67 3.30 84.21 17.60 75.46 3.70 
El Salvador 3.60 3.40 2.90 49.50 57.58 2.60 84.10 13.90 71.73 4.60 
Guatemala 3.20 3.60 2.60 55.00 41.78 2.60 74.47 24.80 70.83 4.70 
Guyana 2.70 3.60 3.30 33.30 80.54 3.80 98.80 25.30 69.55 3.80 
Honduras 2.40 3.50 3.60 54.20  2.40 83.59 20.30 72.83 3.70 
Jamaica 3.30 2.60 4.40 40.50 83.59 2.90 86.36 20.20 72.85 4.20 
Mexico 3.10 2.90 3.20 31.30 71.46 2.80 93.44 14.10 76.68 4.20 
Nicaragua 2.50 3.20 1.80 47.20 45.77 2.20 78.00 22.60 73.73 3.10 
Panama 3.60 3.40 2.10 68.10 68.73 2.40 93.61 17.20 75.97 4.60 
Paraguay 2.20 3.50 1.80 42.50 60.04 2.20 94.56 20.80 72.28 2.50 
Peru 3.50 2.60 2.60 66.30 77.64 2.40 89.59 14.90 73.76 3.50 
Suriname 3.60 2.80 4.40 44.70 50.31 3.60 94.62 26.90 70.34 4.20 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 3.60 3.40 4.40 37.30 68.23 4.60 98.74 24.00 69.76 4.40 
Uruguay 6.90 3.10 5.30 56.00 69.56 3.30 98.27 9.20 76.24 4.30 
Venezuela, 
RB 2.00 2.20 1.60 36.30 71.78 2.90 95.15 15.70 74.13 2.90 
Average 3.48 3.03 3.27 44.18 67.01 3.00 91.14 18.69 73.55 3.85 
Maximum 7.20 3.60 5.50 70.70 83.59 4.60 98.80 41.70 79.19 5.50 
Minimum 2.00 2.00 1.60 21.10 41.78 1.90 74.47 7.70 66.27 2.50 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages               
<= 25% 3.86 3.22 3.14 43.97 65.27 2.68 90.30 16.04 74.73 4.08 
>= 26% and 
<= 30% 3.02 3.12 3.33 44.55 59.47 3.30 88.73 21.58 72.59 3.78 
> 30% 3.41 2.84 3.35 44.17 71.72 3.11 93.02 19.35 73.09 3.71 
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Table A2 - Standard “Musgravian” indicators, 2010 
Country 
Gini 
coefficient 
Coefficient 
of 
variation 
of growth 
Average 
inflation 
GDP per 
capita  GDP growth  Unemployment 
Argentina 44.49 1.55 10.57 11,353.08 4.56 12.71 
Belize 42.00 0.64 2.48 6,103.72 3.94 11.07 
Bolivia 56.29 0.34 5.28 3,881.97 3.85 5.17 
Brazil 54.69 0.71 6.65 8,784.19 3.60 9.85 
Chile 52.06 0.59 3.19 12,880.74 3.76 8.89 
Colombia 55.91 0.46 5.45 7,527.67 4.10 12.84 
Costa Rica 50.73 0.72 10.17 9,331.38 4.28 6.31 
Dominican Republic 47.20 0.69 12.41 6,848.98 5.35 15.93 
Ecuador 49.26 0.56 6.56 6,479.20 4.40 9.24 
El Salvador 48.33 1.06 3.37 5,730.83 1.91 6.68 
Guatemala 55.89 0.48 6.79 4,151.47 3.35 2.42 
Guyana 44.54 1.10 5.90 2,722.43 2.42 10.45 
Honduras 56.95 0.64 7.51 3,295.64 4.09 4.38 
Jamaica 45.51 2.60 11.72 7,127.53 0.76 11.83 
Mexico 48.28 2.08 4.49 12,191.34 1.66 3.88 
Nicaragua 40.47 0.68 8.43 2,338.78 2.94 8.28 
Panama 51.92 0.58 2.86 9,891.56 6.32 9.64 
Paraguay 52.42 1.20 8.00 4,035.80 4.10 6.97 
Peru 48.14 0.58 2.29 6,803.35 5.72 8.87 
Suriname  0.34 10.54 6,159.67 4.77 10.25 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 40.3 0.98 6.92 20,354.88 5.69 7.52 
Uruguay 45.32 1.49 8.91 10,145.20 3.46 11.62 
Venezuela, RB 44.77 2.52 22.67 10,170.00 3.46 11.70 
Average 48.89 0.98 7.53 7,752.58 3.85 8.98 
Minimum 40.3 0.34 2.29 2,338.78 0.76 2.42 
Maximum 56.95 2.6 22.67 2,0354.88 6.32 15.93 
Total spending, % of GDP, averages 
<=25% 50.55 0.89 5.95 7985.05 4.05 7.73 
>=26% and <=30% 48.58 0.61 7.57 7692.64 4.33 8.75 
>30% 46.36 1.29 7.48 6888.99 3.17 10.48 
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Table A3 - Variables and sources 
 
Indices/variables Sources Series and explanations 
Corruption Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 
0 (highly corrupt). 
Red tape World Economic Forum 2011-2012 1 = extremely burdensome; 7 = 
not burdensome at all 
Judicial 
independence 
World Economic Forum 2011-2012  1 = heavily influenced; 7 = 
entirely independent 
Shadow 
economy 
Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, Claudio E. Montenegro 
(2010) 
 % official GDP.  Reciprocal value 
1/x 
School 
enrolment 
secondary gross 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) ratio of total enrollment 
School 
enrolment 
secondary net 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) ratio of children of official school 
age based on the International 
Standard Classification of 
Education 1997  
Quality of math 
and science 
World Economic Forum 2011-2012  1 = poor; 7 = excellent – among 
the best in the world 
Literacy rate World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) % of people ages 15 and above 
Infant mortality 
rate 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)  per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. We used the infant survival 
rate: (1000-IMR)/1000 
Life expectancy World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)  Life expectancy at birth in years 
Infrastructure 
quality 
World Economic Forum 2011-2012 1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = 
extensive and efficient by 
international standards)  
GINI index World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)  0 =perfect equality, 100= perfect 
inequality. We used the following 
transformation 100-GINI 
Coefficient of 
variation growth 
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database) Average 2001-2010: Reciprocal 
value1/x 
Inflation  IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database) Average 2001-2010: Reciprocal 
value 1/x 
 GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) Average 2001-2010: PPP 
(constant 2005 international $) 
GDP growth IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database) Average 2001-2010: Gross 
domestic product, constant prices 
(Percent change) 
Unemployment  IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database) Average 2001-2010: Reciprocal 
value 1/x 
For the following countries literacy rate and GINI index and unemployment rate were taken from different sources: 
Literacy rate http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=bh&v=39 Belize 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=gy&v=39 Guyana 
GINI index http://www.belize.gov.bz/public/Attachment/131612504571.pdf Belize 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2172.html 
Guyana 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_inc_equ_un_gin_ind-
income-equality-un-gini-index 
Trinidad and Tobago  
Unemployment 
rate 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)  Bolivia, Guatemala 
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Table A4 – Non-discretionary factors 
 
Country 
Property 
rights Transparency
Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
corruption
Argentina 2.60 2.65 -0.63 -0.45
Belize 3.80 3.60 -0.25 -0.23
Bolivia 3.13 3.25 -0.52 -0.60
Brazil 4.63 3.85 0.13 -0.03
Chile 5.40 4.90 1.46 1.42
Colombia 4.43 4.15 0.11 -0.22
Costa Rica 4.73 4.20 0.49 0.53
Dominican Republic 4.23 3.95 -0.26 -0.62
Ecuador 3.30 3.20 -0.91 -0.85
El Salvador 4.47 3.90 0.13 -0.37
Guatemala 3.70 3.25 -0.21 -0.61
Guyana 3.55 4.10 -0.48 -0.52
Honduras 3.47 3.65 -0.36 -0.83
Jamaica 4.60 3.70 0.26 -0.45
Mexico 4.47 3.95 0.35 -0.26
Nicaragua 3.33 3.20 -0.35 -0.66
Panama 4.73 3.70 0.38 -0.32
Paraguay 2.97 3.05 -0.62 -1.19
Peru 3.83 3.65 0.26 -0.28
Suriname 3.70 3.60 -0.62 -0.02
Trinidad and Tobago 4.40 3.95 0.63 -0.18
Uruguay 4.80 4.20 0.35 1.02
Venezuela, RB 2.37 2.60 -1.13 -1.00
 
Notes:  
Data are 2000-2010 averages. 
1/ Property rights: 1= are poorly defined and not protected by law, 7 = are clearly defined and well protected by law.  
2/ Transparency:  How easy is for businesses in your country to obtain information about changes in government policies 
and regulation affecting their activities?  1 = impossible; 7 = extremely easy 
3/ Regulatory Quality: Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.  
4/ Control of Corruption: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Sources:  
1/, 2/ - World Economic Forum 2011-2012.  
3/, 4/ - Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
 
